$^1\mathrm{There}$  are only two counts. Count two was previously dismissed (#95, #102) and Plaintiff has retained his prior numbering in his Fourth Amended Complaint.

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move his property. Plaintiff contends that these orders violated his doctor's orders and that the destruction of his legal papers caused him injury in his habeas proceedings in both state and federal court. He further contends that the destruction of his property constituted a deprivation of due process, unconstitutional retaliation for exercising his Eighth Amendment rights, and unconstitutional obstruction of his right to access the courts. In Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint he cites the First and Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment.

We agree with the Magistrate Judge that the allegations are serious and we also agree that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff's legal materials were destroyed. Under the rule of <u>Hudson v. Palmer</u>, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), however, Plaintiff does not have an actionable Fourteenth Amendment claim unless the State of Nevada does not provide "an adequate postdeprivation remedy" for prisoners in Plaintiff's circumstances. Id. at 536; see <u>Emil v. Crawford</u>, 125 Fed.Appx. 112 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying the rule of <u>Hudson v. Palmer</u> to Nevada).

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Lopez retaliated against him "for refusing to comply with her unreasonable order to violate a trained medical professional's preventative / protective medical restrictions," and that the destruction of his property violated his Eighth Amendment rights. (P.'s Opp. To Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., #251-1, at 25). Plaintiff asserts that he "had a right to refuse to engage in [medically] prohibited activities that could injure him or cause him unnecessary pain." (Id. at 26.) Although circumstances might arise where a prisoner could justifiably refuse

to comply with an outrageous order from a prison guard, the Eighth Amendment does not create an affirmative constitutional right to refuse orders. Even if we were to recognize such a right, Defendant Lopez would be entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

With respect to Plaintiff's claim in count one that he has unconstitutionally been deprived of access to the courts, Plaintiff objects that the Magistrate Judge has found that the Nevada Supreme Court considered his Amended Opening Brief in his habeas appeal, whereas a different federal judge in this district previously found the opposite in requiring Plaintiff to exhaust his state habeas Plaintiff argues that this discrepancy creates a genuine issue of material fact. We disagree, and the Magistrate Judge squarely addressed this issue, noting that "Rather than notifying this court [i.e., the federal district court judge considering Plaintiff's federal habeas petition] that the Nevada Supreme Court had indeed considered plaintiff's amended opening brief on his petition for rehearing, plaintiff elected dismiss the entire action and return to state court to exhaust." (Report and Recommendation at 18 (#266) (emphasis added).) In light of the denial of the petition for rehearing, the fact that the prior Amended Opening Brief was filed very shortly before the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in his state habeas appeal does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his filing was considered. Moreover, even if the Amended Opening Brief was not considered Plaintiff's allegation that he was injured remains complete speculation.

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There is no evidence before this Court that would establish that the alleged destruction of Plaintiff's legal documents either impaired his right to file his habeas claim or prevented the Nevada Supreme Court from reviewing it. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate evidence of any actual injury.

In count three Plaintiff alleges that Lopez retaliated against him for filing grievances by submitting false disciplinary reports. Defendant argues that the "some evidence" standard is applicable to Plaintiff's claim that the disciplinary charges were retaliatory. Ninth Circuit precedent makes it quite clear that the "some evidence" standard does not apply to Plaintiff's claim. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1997). Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment with respect to count three.

Plaintiff's pro se complaint leaves some ambiguity as to whether he intended to plead First Amendment retaliation with respect to the destruction of his property in count one or in count three. The Magistrate Judge, in recommending granting summary judgment on count one, nevertheless considered the facts of count one as they were incorporated by reference into count three. We agree with the Magistrate Judge that summary judgment cannot be granted on this record with respect to Plaintiff's claim that the destruction of his property was retaliation for Plaintiff's prior filing of grievances in violation of the First Amendment.

Defendant's motion (#238) for summary judgment is **GRANTED** with respect to count one of Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice to Plaintiff pursuing state law remedies for the deprivation of his

## property. Defendant's motion (#238) for summary judgment is **DENIED** with respect to count three of Plaintiff's complaint. DATED: This 26th day of March, 2007 Edward C. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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